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Newsmakers

Host: Pedro Echevarria

Guest: U.S. Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI), Senate Armed Services Committee Member

Reporters: Jim Michaels, “USA Today”

and John Mulligan, “The Providence Journal”

PEDRO ECHEVARRIA, HOST, C-SPAN’S “NEWSMAKERS”: Joining us on Newsmakers, Senator Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. And joining us with the questioning, Jim Michaels, of “USA Today,” and John Mulligan, of “The Providence Journal.”

Senator, you've been to Iraq now 11 times and you've said that the surge has not achieved President Bush’s objectives. How so?

SEN. JACK REED, D-RHODE ISLAND, MEMBER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: Well, the fundamental objective was the political reconciliation of the Iraqi people and the effective governance by the Iraqi government. That has is not happening. In fact, today General Petraeus made it clear that he and all the officials are disappointed in the political steps that the Iraqis have taken. Without this political progress, they can’t be a stable, long-term, government and society in Iraq. And that’s the key. And we can’t because of constraints on our force maintain indefinitely 140,000 troops. So they have to take the political decisions that are difficult, but absolutely necessary.

ECHEVARRIA: The White House has said that on the ground progress will result in political progress. Will it?

REED: Not necessarily. I think that the progress is real, but it’s very fragile in terms of the security situation. And it’s a function of several interlocking issues. One is our increased troops, but not exclusively. Two, political movements in Anbar Province with Sunni tribesmen who came over to our side because they were so appalled by the Al Qaeda extremism. The fact that Sadr, the Shia leader, decided to stand down for at least six months and extended that. And also the fact that the surrogates of Iran have sort of laid low. All of those factors are reversed – well, in fact they're beginning to reverse already. We’re pulling our troops down. There is an uneasy sort of situation with the Sunni militias who are our allies but they haven’t been absorbed yet into the Iraqi security forces. Sadr’s extended his ceasefire by six months, but it’s just six months. And the Iranians remain a wild card. So most military leaders, reported in the press as well as privately, suspect that the violence will come up and that’ll further complicate the political rapprochement that is necessary.

ECHEVARRIA: Jim Michaels, of "USA Today.”

JIM MICHAELS, “USA TODAY”: Senator, if I could just follow on that. You've pointed out that the – that the surge has led to a lot of tactical gains, security progress on the ground, but the political accommodation at the national level isn’t there yet. What would you do differently to put more pressure on the government of Prime Minister Maliki?

REED: Well, I returned convinced that the efforts that Senator Levin and I have tried to lead over the last year of making it the policy of the United States to begin a phased withdrawal of forces based upon the condition on the ground. Making it an official policy of the United States might be the last lever we have. Because, frankly, when the president comes to us and opposes that, refuses effectively any conditions, it’s hard for him to go back to the Iraqis and say, now, you've got to do this. Because they understand he’s basically said publicly and to the American people I'm going to support these people regardless of what they do unconditionally. We have to have some conditions. They have to be I think sensible. They can’t constrain tactical operations. But we have to do that.

In addition, I think we have to begin to look at a regional approach. The solution to stability over the long term can’t be simply something we create and gives to the Iraqis. It has to be something that they want to do, first, and, second, is supported in the region.

So those are just two basic steps that we have to take and we haven't taken them.

MICHAELS: But you don't – you don't think a time table would be a good idea at this point?

REED: I think a – I think the first step is to make it clear that we’re coming out, we’re coming out with all deliberate speed. I'm just a little reluctant to impose kind of the deadlines, because they can gained against us as well as using – as well as our diplomats using it as leverage. But we clearly have to indicate, and there has to be more than just sort of a – in a speech. I think it has to be policy that we’re coming out. And with the expectation that we will in fact make substantial reduction in our forces.

ECHEVARRIA: John Mulligan.

JOHN MULLIGAN, “THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL”: Just to draw you out on that point, Senator. The – most Democrats agreed with you that the invasion was a bad idea, were skeptical of the surge a year ago. But there’s a division in the party over where to go now in terms of this troop withdrawal. So I wonder if we could draw you out a little bit more specifically on why you disagree with that large fraction of Democrats, including both presidential candidates who think we need to fix a time table for withdrawals and essentially get most of the combat troops out within 12 months. What are the liabilities that you see in doing that?

REED: Well, first, I think it’s important to note that I agree with what they want to do, which is to significantly reduce our presence there, shift to a diplomatic effort and a regional effort. And I think what we’re differing about is the technique of accomplishing the overall goal, which is reducing our troops presence, our combat troop presence. And, you know, this is a fair debate. I think the problem we have run into is that in order to provide operational flexibility, any sort of time table will be very highly conditional, highly contingent. So it’s not going to be this rigorous time table (INAUDIBLE), and I think they’d say that, too. So in some respects we’re – it might be, you know, how we’re saying things rather than a fundamental disagreement.

But I think if we give our military forces the mission to begin to shift out of this population protection mission into the three missions which I think are critical to our success and them sustainability of the effort. One is training Iraqi forces; two is counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda or terrorist elements; and, three, is the force protection, which is essential. I think if we focus more on the missions than the time table, we can accomplish what we want to do, which is reduce our profile.

MULLIGAN: Would (INAUDIBLE) result in – if Congress were to insist on drawing out most of these troops within, say, 12 months (INAUDIBLE)

REED: I think – I think what you'd find if we could get to that point – and, frankly – and, you know, since you've been following this closely, John – Senator Levin and I have tried various alternative, including hard deadlines, soft deadlines, a deadline to initiate a withdrawal. If we could get a – a Congressional formulation that is adopted by – on a bipartisan basis, I would suspect that that might mention deadlines, but they’d be highly conditional, that there would act - they’d have to take into consideration what commander (ph) on the ground were saying about simply protecting our forces. But my hope is that – and going back Steve’s point – you know, what we have to do is send a message to the Iraqi political leaders that we’re not there forever, that there will be conditions. And the first set of conditions I think necessarily will be rather open ended, but that they'll be official.

MICHAELS: General Petraeus and Secretary Gates have talked about a pause in the draw-down after - that we go down to 15 brigades by July. Is that a good idea?

REED: You know, I think it’s a function really of it’s a pause of a few weeks or months to assess what’s going on or is it just another word we’re stuck and we’re staying there. I think the latter category’s unacceptable. I think what we have to do is, as I’ve said before, make it clear our policy is coming out, the pace, the tempo might be subject and should be subject to what’s happening on the ground. But the reality is we’ve got to send a signal to the Iraqis. And the other reality is the fact that our military forces, our land forces, are stretched beyond their – increasingly stretched beyond their capabilities. And on the impact on soldiers, Marines, their families is becoming devastating. So for that reason also we have to get out, you know, an expeditious but in a careful way.

MULLIGAN: Now, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will be coming here in April to talk to Congress and report to the White House. What kind of things will you be looking for from them? What sort of answers will be you be seeking?

REED: Well, I think there’s a series of critical political issues that the Iraqi government has to face, in addition to the legislative agenda, which so far they've been, you know, sort of under-performing. That is, reconciliation, allocation of oil revenues, regionalization issues. But there’s critical issues. One is the issue of Kirkuk, which is in the north where the Kurds are suggesting that they want a huge swath of territory around Kirkuk, and that if they don't get it they'll be angry. That is seen by the Sunni community as another marginalization of their community. That could be a – by the middle of summer a real point of contention.

The second issue – and it may be in some respects more critical – is that the policy of the United States or the last year, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, was basically to organize about 60,000 or so Sunnis into these militias. Some of then integrated, a very small fraction, into the Iraqi security forces. But there’s a roughly 60,000 armed militia that if they're not accepted by the Shia government will be a potential force in opposition to them, quite contentious, either criminal activity or political activity. I'm very curious about what the progress we’re making. If those forces can’t be absorbed, then they are going to be a source of contention. Those are two critical issues.

And then the other issue, which was highlighted this week, was the suggestion that the Iraqis have to go in and basically pacify Basra, so what’s happening in the south. We don't talk a lot about that. But that’s a huge part of the country. It’s the economic gateway for Iraq. And if that is in the control of gangs and Shia militias and religious extremists, then how can – in the long run can we stay (INAUDIBLE)

MICHAELS: On the issue of Basra, and it is a key port; it’s a key piece of terrain, and it’s mostly Shiite. Was it a good idea for the British to withdraw from the city and move to kind of a large base and not really move that into the community anymore?

REED: It was a good idea for the British. I don't think it was long-term a good idea, because I think a presence there, a military presence, an intel presence was absolutely critical. One of the things that you have to recognize is that British forces, their whole military land force is about the size of our Marine Corps. They don't have a lot of troops. And their approach in terms of not only manpower but their counter insurgency approach is one that’s sort of hands-off, not hands-on. But that was a – we didn't have the resources ourselves to second guess them or replace it with American forces. We had to let them do what they do best and what they like to do. But I think now we’re seeing a real – the consequences of that. We have special forces that are operating down there, but as the Marines pull out, we have very little in terms of the allied forces to replace. They have to depend upon the Iraqis. And the question is will their forces be capable operationally and politically in dealing with these Shia militias and the gangs that are operating the port.

MULLIGAN: Senator, it seems pretty clear that the groups you mentioned, Sadr’s people, the Iranian proxies for (INAUDIBLE) Shiites in Iraq, and the Sunni tribal leaders out in the west are essential components of this lull that’s going on now. Could you run through the list and say how you assess the likelihood that those choices to stand down in the case of Sadr and the alliance (INAUDIBLE) convenience in the case of the Sunnis will persist to a – the benefit of the United States enterprise over there.

REED: I don't think this situation is stable in the long-term. And the question is six months or six years. But in the long-term there is so much potential rivalry that something will happen. And there’s so many opportunities – if Kirkuk is not handled well, that could generate Sunni reaction and Kurdish reaction. If Sadr decides within several months, by the end of the summer, that, you know, he’s ready to strike or his elements decide he is no longer speaking for them – in fact, there’s some indications that’s happening now – if the Sunni awakening forces, these militias are not integrated or they don't think they have a future, they will become at least criminal operations it not, you know, politically oriented. There is attempts I think by former Baathists in Damascus and other places to move money in for a political rearrangement of the Sunni forces in Anbar Province. All of these things are potentially disruptive, and there are so many that I think I’d have to suggest that – and if I was betting – that the level of violence will go up at the end of the year, because one of these factors will precipitate violence. And it might even be a chain reaction. So it’s – I think in the longer term we’re in for some increased violence.

MICHAELS: Do you suppose that violence will also increase as the five surge battalions clear out of Iraq?

REED: I think that’s a potential. They're trying – and we’ve been very fortunate. Both General Petraeus and General Ordiurno (ph) have proven to be very, very tactically perceptive. And they're very, very good soldiers. And they know this. They're trying to reorient the disposition of the forces on the ground to minimize that. But I think they'd all say that, you know, there’s – there are gaps in the line as you pull more troops out. But the reality is – and this is the reality of the surge before it began – is our force structure will not allow us to keep more than this number of troops in place. So, you know, even as the president announced the surge, most people looking at the numbers would say, well, that’s going to end regardless of the results on the ground by the middle of this summer. And it’s happening.

MICHAELS: Senator, let me ask about one of the developments in the Pentagon. William Fallon, admiral, retired, 14 months on the job. Was he forced out, was it voluntary, and what does it mean?

REED: It’s hard at this point to sort of discern what it exactly went on. My impression was that there was some principals – discussions between General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon about the course of activities in the area of operations. And I think there’s another factor that is implicit in what happened, is that Admiral Fallon was the superior of General Petraeus, he was the chain of command, he was above him. But because of political reasons and the White House need for – to personalize a new change in strategy, General Petraeus was sort of exalted, not in terms of ranks of in terms of public position, above Fallon. I think that was sort of difficult for a commander to deal with. You've got a subordinate who can go around you. And I don't know if he did or not, but that perception was out there.

And then I think Admiral Fallon, because his responsibilities transcend Iraq, was a whole host of areas – Afghanistan, Pakistan – we’re looking at force structure, looking at the reserve he has for contingencies. And he was, one, I think less focused on some of the issues within Iraq – he shouldn't have been, his responsible was region-wide – but also I think he recognized that our approach to Iran had to rely because of force limitations on diplomacy. And I think he made that clear. But he was no more different than comments I’ve heard from Admiral Mullin and Secretary Gates. I think, though, that the last article in “Esquire” was not so much what he said, but what was editorialized suggested that have was much more adamantly opposed to what might be the president’s policy. All these factors came together.

Ultimately, my sense is that he decided – it wasn’t one of those situations where he was told to, you know, to pack up and leave. I think he just decided that it might have been an anticipation of such a call from the SecDept or the White House.

MULLIGAN: I was just going to talk a little bit about Al Qaeda in Iraq. And the U.S. military describes their condition now as being disrupted. Not defeated, disrupted, on the defensive. Their ability to plan attacks is minimal. And in your last trip to Iraq, you – in your report you mentioned that commanders expected sort of a defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, if I understand it, by this coming summer, sort of irreversible momentum. Is that realistic, is that a kind of accurate description of what you were told?

REED: My sense – from listening to commanders on the ground, special forces particularly, is that they've made significant progress. But what we’ve learned over the last several years is the resiliency of these organizations because or their sort of horizontal organization. It’s not a hierarchy where you take out the leader and they're set back for years. So I think even though they feel they've made decisive gains against Al Qaeda in Iraq that they know that if it’s left unattended that it could spring back. I mean – but that’s the situation, frankly, in every ungoverned area in the world. Somalia is an example, where if you had no attention down there, you know, the Al Qaeda elements could find their way in in a decentralized way, reconstitute and become a threat. So that’s one of the continuing challenges we face world-wide.

MICHAELS: (INAUDIBLE) there’s worries that some of these militants will, if pressure is too intense in Iraq, will go to the tribal areas in Pakistan or Afghanistan, for example.

REED: I think there’s a real concern that either they will migrate there because we’re forcing them out, or because there’s a recalculation of the strategy of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the leadership, which is basically – you know, we’ve – we have no leverage, traction in Iraq, we can come back here in Pakistan. And what’s emerging in Pakistan is very alarming because I think even the government of Pakistan recognizes they're in a low level insurgency right now. What was a benign sort of toleration of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas has now grown to the fact that they've coming out of the tribal areas, they're conducting suicide attacks within Pakistan, their area of influence is growing. And I think the Pakistanis are very worried that they can’t tolerate this any longer. They haven't taken decisive action yet, but they’re worried.

MULLIGAN: Senator, just about three years ago at this time you were in Iraq with the then regional commander, General Advisay (ph), probably the last comparable lull in the violence to what we see today. So I wonder if you could compare and contrast the situation, and particularly to say whether with this new team from Secretary Gates on down the United States has learned and acted upon important lessons, or are we repeating the same mistakes that we saw three years ago that led you to say we could still blow it.

REED: I think what’s happened is that the administration – and, first of all, I think Secretary Gates is extraordinarily capable (INAUDIBLE) Secretary of Defense, you know, and also (INAUDIBLE) decent guy. I think he’s added (ph) a huge difference to the Department of Defense. I think the value of meet advice is much higher with Bob Gates than it was with Secretary Rumsfeld. And I think part of the success is attributable to his leadership style. I think what they've done, though – and they've done it consciously – is they've attempted to buy time with increase in forces, with different approaches. I think the approach that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker took with the Sunnis – rather than try to alienate them, but try to bring them in – it was a calculated risk. It’s paid off so far. It could go the other way decisively. But this all amounts to buying time for the fundamental issue of political reform. You know, General Advisay (ph) was making the same points four years ago. You know, we’ve secured sort of a respite from the anarchy that existing immediately after the invasion. But now the Iraqi government has to take steps, and we have to take steps. And one of the consistent failures of our policy has not been the military side, but the civilian side. You're creating the capacity to govern. They're helping mentor the Iraqis to, you know, deliver social service, to have a court system, to have economic development. That’s still failing dramatically. And that seems to but the one thing that when you – all is said and done, people in Iraq are looking around, is my life better than it was. And they're saying many times, no, it’s not. This violence has to stop and they're occupiers. And that’s what I find very disconcerting.

Just this week some – the Sunni community asked for the United Nations to come in and take over so that the occupation would end. That mentality means that we can’t stay there much longer.

MICHAELS: Now, a counter-insurgency is, of course, only a small percentage military, and much of it is economics and political and the rest of it. And you've made the point that you think the military is, you know, is at war, but other branches of out government are not. The State Department, the Agriculture Department and so forth. How do you change that? I mean, how do you – how could you turn that around so that we could bring to bear those other parts of the government.

REED: Well, it would take years. And in the middle of a fight like this it’s – the capacity for any leader to do that is severely limited. Simply you're fighting fires and dealing with crises. It would take a long-term reorientation of our government. It would represent a cultural change, in the State Department, AID, Department of Justice. And then there are – there are a lot of things that could have been done to hasten that change. You know, one of the interesting things was that up until very recently there – assignment to Iraq from the State Department was completely voluntary. You know, you were ordering young private and corporal airmen and, you know, bowsons (ph) mates (ph) to go there. DOD, that’s their culture. State, well, you have volunteer. And that’s changing, but it’s not changing fast enough. And then the development of expertise, just language expertise. I mean, we have so few people that can speak these languages. We have – you know, we don't have a stable of people who are trained city managers or agronomists to throw into the – critically to the mix. I can recall – I don't know, I – if it was our trip with General Advisay (ph) to talk to the General Nix (ph) and the commander of the 25^th a few years ago. He says, you know., what I need, Senator, is not more infantrymen. I need agronomists. This is a farmer community. And if we can show them how to farm more effectively, that’s better than sending out two or three, you know, squads of infantrymen.

It’s going to take a long term. And it’s also going to take I think – and it’s something that is a fundamental sort of reorientation or approach – which is are we committing ourselves to that effort over many years, which is very expensive, or are we simply, you know, trying to move out of Iraq and then go back to the posture we had basically after Vietnam, which was we fight conventional wars and we – and we avoid other types of confrontations (ph).

MULLIGAN: (INAUDIBLE) we’re in an election year, Senator. Do you suppose there is a realistic role for the Democratic Congress to play in guiding the president? You know, there are a lot of Democrats out there who were very upset that with the majority, your side has not reduced the war commitment. And at the same time there are many in your camp who are now a little bit leery of undoing the – these tactical gains of the surge. Are you better off to just lie low until after the elections, or are you going to seek legislatively to coerce the president’s hand?

REED: I think we have to continue to change the policy legislatively. Because I think in the long run we have to develop a sustainable policy. And the current policy is not sustainable. And I think also, too, that – I don't think this will happen because of both the ideology and the – and the temperament of the president – but I think that if he is the one working with us, sending the signal to the Iraqi government that they have to change their ways, that would be not only timely but appropriate. If we wait till the outcome of election, either way it’s going to send a signal to the Iraqi government. If the signal is you've got four more years at least to do nothing, that’s not going to be good for us. If the signal is, you know, sort of precipitously, you know, and they misinterpret their leaving tomorrow, that might not be the best thing. So I think there’s a – not just in terms of political dynamics, but in terms of the long term success of our efforts, not just there but around the globe, that the president would be better served working with us to develop this, this principal bipartisan approach to a change in strategy.

ECHEVARRIA: Senator, before we let you go, any interest in serving as the Defense Secretary in a Democratic administration?

REED: No. I have an extraordinarily challenging job. I'm very privileged to be able to represent the people of Rhode Island. And I hope that it will give me the opportunity to serve six more years, all six years.

ECHEVARRIA: Senator Jack Reed. Thank you for joining us on Newsmakers.

REED: Thank you.

(INAUDIBLE) & B-Roll

ECHEVARRIA: I'm going to introduce you both, but I'm going to turn to you first. (INAUDIBLE) what did you learn (ph)? So (INAUDIBLE).

John Mulligan, of the Providence Journal, and Jim Michaels, of "USA Today", what did you learn?

MICHAELS: Well, it’s kind of interesting. There’s an interesting political dynamic. It’s by no means a popular war in Iraq. But on the other hand, Democrats I think are having difficulty in sort of capitalizing on the discontent among the American public. The surge has led to some security progress, there’s no doubt about it. The political reconciliation, that piece of it is not where it needs to be yet. But it’s very ambiguous. And I think the opposition to war is sort of split in many faceted where the Republican support for policy in Iraq seems to be more unified.

I think a lot of this may come to a head next month when General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker come back and talk to Congress as they did back in September. But now they are going to be able to point to a number of tactical gains. But nonetheless, very real gains on the security front and some gains on the political front. Not all they want. So I think a lot of this will be coming to the head next month in Washington.

ECHEVARRIA: And what about the political differences between what Senator Reed has said and also his support for Senate Clinton and also what Barack Obama, the other Democratic candidate, has said with regard to Iraq?

MULLIGAN: Well, he – Senator Reed has not taken a favorite in the presidential race; he’s still on the fence. But he’s an unusual Democrat in some ways. He did vote against the invasion and he was a skeptic of the surge. But he’s been very careful, along with Senator Levin, the Chairman of The Armed Services Committee, to avoid legislation that would require hard and fast deadlines and reduction of troop levels by a certain amount. So that puts him somewhat at odds, although he does not advertise it, with Senator Obama, who’s very much in favor of removing most of the combat troops rather quickly.

ECHEVARRIA: What is his role in the Democratic Senate leadership?

MULLIGAN: Well, he’s part of an informal group of war council, so to speak, set up by Leader Reid – Harry Reid, of Nevada. And since he’s come to the senate in 1997, he has pretty rapidly become one of the people to see for what do the generals really mean by what they're telling us. He began traveling often with Senator Levin when he first came to the Senate, long before the war. And his background as a West Point graduate and his first career as military – an Army officer has made him someone that other Democrats respect and trust on this issue.

ECHEVARRIA: Jim Michaels, you've been there how many times, how many times to Iraq?

MICHAELS: About 10 or 11 times now since the beginning. Yes.

ECHEVARRIA: And so what you heard from him today, does that correlate with what you've seen?

MICHAELS: Yes. No, I think his assessment is very substantial. I mean, I think he hits on a lot of points. His interpretation, you may agree or disagree with, but he’s – he goes there, he gets outside of Baghdad, he talks to a lot of folks. His assessment of a lot of the gains are based on the fact that there are more U.S. troops there, but a lot of the gains are also based on the fact that there’s been a political accommodation with the Sunnis. A political accommodation. And also the Shiites under Muqtada al Sadr, these guys have declared a ceasefire for six months, and then extended it another six months. And so his description I think is very, accurate.

Now, he also describes a lot of these accommodations as tentative, I think as reversible. And I'm not even sure you get too much disagreement there, but certainly in the degree there’s room for disagreement. But I think his assessment of what’s going on on the ground seems to be pretty comprehensive. And I don't think you'd see a lot of disagreement with this description of how things are now in Iraq.

ECHEVARRIA: And finally it’s seeing some praise for Secretary Gates. Is that consistent with what you’ve heard before with regard to his working relationship with the new Defense Secretary (ph).

MICHAELS: He was – he was pleased with the nomination when President Bush first made it, because he’s known Secretary Gates for a long time. And I think Senator Reed is not along even among rank and file Democrats in very much applauding this secretary’s approach.

ECHEVARRIA: Finally, did you learn something today?

MICHAELS: Yes, I think so. I think it was an interesting and – you know, the – insightful look at, you know, how I think Democrats are starting to position themselves as – in the coming months. We’ve got elections coming up, obviously, and we’ve got the big hearings coming up next month. And so you're starting to see these positions surface and harden.

MULLIGAN: It’s interesting – to follow up on Jim’s point about the visit of Petraeus and Cocker to Congress – just about six months after their last visit they atmosphere is very different. Senator Reed’s resolution to change the direction in Iraq at its most got 52 votes in the Senate, not enough to clear a filibuster. It’s hard to imagine even in a Democratic majority Senate, with the surge, with the polls beginning to show some softening of opposition to the war, that the Democrats can push a policy change after this visit by the secretary and the ambassador.

ECHEVARRIA: This has been Newsmakers on CSPAN. We want to thank Jim Michaels, of "USA Today", and John Mulligan, of the Providence Journal. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us.

END